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1 . INTRODUCTION
In social micro-experiments, the experimenter assigns treatments and
gauges responses at the individual level. The response of each individual is
assumed to be independent and small in comparison to the market or social
system.
In social macro-experiments, treatments are assigned at the group,
community, or market level. The responses of entire social units, as well as
of individuals within each unit, are the objects of interest. The responses
of the individuals within each unit are correlated (Rivlin, 1974; Hosteller
and Hosteller, 1979).
Economists and other social scientists, I contend here, have spent
disproportionately too much effort on the design and interpretation of micro-
experiments. The potential value and limitations of macro-experiments have
not been adequately characterized. Accordingly, we need to develop a new
science of macro-experimental design, and to articulate more carefully the
tradeoff between micro and macro designs as guides to public policy.
Hy argument is framed within the context of health policy experiments.
I concentrate on two policy issues: the effect of changes in health
insurance coverage on the demand for medical care; and the effect of life-
style intervention on the risk of coronary heart disease (CHD).
In Section 2, I point out several problems in the design,
implementation, and interpretation of micro-experiments for health policy.
These include subject selection and attrition, anticipatory responses,
Hawthorne effects, and ethical constraints on individual randomization.
Although the results of micro-experiments may elucidate certain mechanisms of
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individual behavior, they may not reveal the total, market equilibrium
effects of policy alternatives.
Section 3 considers how macro-experiments may resolve these micro-
experimental difficulties. Because macro-experimentation can be less
intrusive upon individuals, these experiments may avoid the potential
selection and attrition biases, Hawthorne effects, and ethical constraints
characteristic of micro-experiments. Most important, macro-experiments can
be more useful for evaluating the total market or social system effects of
policy options.
In Section 4, I discuss two serious limitations of macro-
experimentation. First, intervention at the market or community level
reduces the statistical power of the experiment and, in some cases, threatens
its external validity. Second, the macro-experimenter may be likely to
encounter significant political and administrative obstacles to
randomization.
Section 5 considers how these defects of macro-experimentation might be
avoided. Decentralization of macro-experiments, along with experimental
blocking, is suggested as a means of improving statistical power and
overcoming administrative barriers to randomization. Time series
experiments, cross-over designs, as well as mixtures of micro and macro
designs, are considered. To resolve questions of external validity, I show
how the results of different macro-experiments might be combined.
Throughout the analysis, I focus on the experience of two micro-
experiments—the Rand Health Insurance Study (Newhouse, 1974) and the
Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (Multiple Risk Factor Intervention
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Trial Group, 1976a, b)—and one macro-experiment—the Stanford Heart Disease
Prevention Program (Farquhar, 1978), Several other macro-experiments in
life-style intervention are in progress or under consideration,^ But no bona
fide macro-experiment in health insurance or medical care utilization has
been undertaken. One goal of Section 5 is to suggest how such experiments
might be executed.
This paper is not a broad endorsement of macro-experimentation for
health policy. It does not advocate the abandonment of micro-experiments.
Nor do I envisage a strict choice between micro and macro designs. But in
many cases, precise micro-estimates of only one or two parameters of a
problem do not justify our plunging into full-scale policies. Less precise
macro-assessments of the total impact of contemplated policies may then be
warranted.
2. PROBLEMS WITH MICRO-EXPERIMENTS
First, I set forth the background of two micro-experiments in health
policy.
The Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MRFIT)
Epidemiologists have repeatedly shown that high blood pressure, elevated
^The Stanford Five-City Project (Hulley and Fortmann, 1980); the North
Karelia Project (Puska et al
.
, 1978); the Minnesota Community Prevention
Program; the Pawtucket Heart Health Program; the European Collaborative Heart
Disease Prevention Project (WHO European Collaborative Group, 1974; Rose et
al., 1980); and the Pennsylvania County Health Improvement Program (Stolley,
1980).
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blood cholesterol, and cigarette smoking are independent, powerful predictors
of an individual's risk of fatal and non-fatal events of coronary heart
disease (Truett et al
.
, 1967). Men and women who spontaneously quit smoking
incur a lower risk of subsequent coronary events than continuing smokers
(Friedman et al
.
, 1981). These findings have been derived from the natural
histories of various study populations (for example, residents of Framingham,
Massachusetts). To dispel objections that such predictive relationships are
not really causal, it would be logical to attempt to reverse each of the
above "risk factors" in a randomized experiment.
Separate clinical trials have been instituted to lower blood
cholesterol, to treat hypertension, and to induce smoking cessation (Davis
and Havlik, 1977; Hypertension Detection and Follow-up Program Cooperative
Group, 1979a, 1979b; Rose and Hamilton, 1978). The difficulty with such
single-factor experiments is that participation in the trial is a total
experience (Syme, 1978). An experiment may be designed to test the isolated
effect to lowering blood pressure. But when subjects are instructed to take
antihypertensive medications, and possibly to restrict salt and caloric
intake and increase physical activity, they inevitably modify dietary fat
intake, smoking, and other aspects of behavior.
The Multiple Risk Factor Intervention trial (Kuller et al., 1980; MRFIT
Group, 1976a, 1976b, 1977; Sherwin et al
.
, 1979) recognized this limitation
of single-factor trials. The protocol was designed to test the hypothesis
that lowering serum cholesterol by diet, reducing high blood pressure by diet
and drugs, and cessation of cigarette smoking, in combination
,
would result
in a reduced risk of death from CHD. Men aged 35 to 57, who smoked
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cigarettes, had elevated blood pressure and cholesterol, but who displayed no
initial evidence of CHD, were to be followed for six years. After initial
screening of 361,661 subjects during 1974-76, a total of 12,866 subjects were
randomly assigned either to a program of special intervention (Sl) directed
toward these risk factors or to their usual source of medical care (UC) . The
experiment is being conducted at MRFIT clinics in 22 sites across the
country, and is scheduled for completion in early 1982.
The Rand Health Insurance Study (HIS)
The responsiveness of medical care demand to price is an important
factor in the design of health insurance and the control of rising medical
expenditures. Price elasticities of demand for medical services have been
estimated from a variety of data sources. But the main source of price
variation in these non-experimental data is the terms of insurance coverage.
Since consumers select their insurance on the basis of health status, income,
family composition, and other factors affecting demand, such estimates could
be seriously misleading.
The Rand Health Insurance Study (Manning, Morris, Newhouse et al., 1981;
Manning, Newhouse, and Ware, 1981; Morris, 1979; Morris, Newhouse, and
Archibald, 1980; Newhouse, 1974; Newhouse et al.,.1979) was designed to
overcome this limitation. A sample of approximately 8000 individuals in 2823
families was enrolled in six sites across the country. Families were
enrolled in one of 14 different HIS insurance plans for either three or five
years. These plans ranged from free care, to 95 percent coinsurance below a
maximum dollar expenditure, to assignment in a prepaid group practice. Low-
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income families were oversampled. Persons eligible for Medicare, heads of
households 61 years of age and older at the time of enrollment, members of
the military, and the institutionalized population were excluded. Enrollment
of subjects at the Dayton site was completed in 1975, while enrollment at the
Georgetown County, S.C, site was completed in 1979. In addition to analysis
of the effects of various insurance plans on medicare demand, the effects of
coverage on health status (Brook et al
.
, 1979; Ware et al
.
, 1980), certain
administrative aspects of health insurance, and the effects of HMO care are
under study.
Both MRFIT and HIS can be legitimately called second generation social
experiments. Their designers took advantage of considerable prior experience
in clinical trials and social experimentation. Nevertheless, these micro-
experiments exhibit important difficulties in design, execution, and
interpretation. These difficulties are now considered.
Subject Selection and Other Pre-Experimental Biases
In MRFIT, subjects were initially screened, primarily at work sites, by
a series of medical examinations (Kuller et al., 1980). Those eligible at
the first screening, on the basis of blood pressure, cholesterol and smoking
habits, were invited to a second, more detailed medical screening, at which
time the purpose and duration of the study were explained. For those who
returned for the third and final screening, informed consent was obtained and
then randomization was performed. Since the trial was aimed at men with high
CHD risk, and since the experiment could not be blinded, potential subjects
f
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were necessarily informed of their medical status during the screening
process
.
It is reasonable to suspect that the initial volunteers in this
experiment were highly motivated and therefore more susceptible to
intervention than the general population. Of those subjects initially
eligible by risk factor criteria, about thirty percent declined to
participate. Many of them merely refused to consider quitting smoking. It
is also hard to imagine that the screening process itself had little effect
on subjects' behavior and attitudes. Among those subjects who were
ultimately randomized, mean diastolic blood pressure declined by about 10mm
Hg from the first to the final screening examination, while the fraction of
smokers declined by about five percent. Comparable changes were observed in
blood cholesterol. These results may reflect changes in measurement methods
between screening exams or statistical regression to the mean. Nevertheless,
the evidence suggests that the pre-experimental phase constituted a form of
life-style intervention.
The planners of MRFIT screened for subjects with high CHD risks in order
to increase the statistical power of the experiment (MRFIT, 1977). But this
practice is not without its problems. Blood pressure, cholesterol, and
smoking are undoubtedly influenced by such factors as diet, stress, physical
activity, socioeconomic status, family history, occupation and peer pressure,
^Selection was actually based on "modifiable risk," which is not
necessarily synonjnnous with "high risk." This modifiable risk score was
based on a multiple logistic model of CHD risk, estimated from the Framingham
study data (Truett et al
.
, 1967), in combination with educated guesses about
differential success rates in reducing risk factors.
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many of which are difficult to measure. These additional, unmeasured
variables also affect how subjects' CHD rates respond to experimental
intervention. Pre-experimental screening on the basis of blood pressure,
cholesterol, and smoking can produce a population of subjects that is highly
unrepresentative with respect to the unmeasured variables. Some men who
qualify for this study will be former smokers who have backslided into the
habit as a result of, say, transient job-related stress. Others will be
light smokers who have transient elevations in blood pressure due to, say,
excessive salt use or weight gain. Still others will be inveterate heavy
smokers. Although the experiment would still yield an unbiased estimate of
the effect of special intervention among those patients who qualified, it is
not clear how the estimated experimental effect relates to the overall
population response. This difficulty applies not only to experimental
responses in risk factors, but also to the effect of intervention on CHD
incidence. It is compounded further if the additional, unmeasured variables
also affect subject attrition during the experiment.
In the Health Insurance Study, the experimenters randomly sampled
dwelling units and conducted initial interviews in order to ascertain the
occupants' ages, incomes, and other data pertinent to eligibility. A
baseline interview was administered to eligible families in order to elicit
information about prior insurance status. Following verification of the
insurance information, families were selected, assigned to the various plans,
and contacted for an enrollment interview (Newhouse, 1974; Morris, 1979;
Morris, Newhouse, and Archibald, 1980). If the assigned plan represented
less extensive insurance than the subjects had prior to entry, then the
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experimenters offered them a compensating incentive payment, in fixed
installments, but unconditional upon subsequent medical care consumption.
Consent to participate in the study was elicited after these steps had been
taken. Of 3863 families who completed baseline interviews and were assigned
to treatments, 10 percent refused the enrollment interview. Of those who
agreed to the enrollment interview, 19 percent refused the offer to enroll.
The HIS incentive payment scheme was intended to ensure that subjects in
all treatment groups were no worse off financially by participating in the
experiment. At worst, such payments were supposed to have a small income
effect on demand. Nevertheless, with refusal rates on the order of 20
percent, it is worth inquiring whether prior assignment to a plan could have
affected the decision to participate in the experiment. Those families
assigned to the high coinsurance plans were more likely to receive incentive
payments. In these families, the decision to participate should depend more
heavily upon attitudes toward risk, expectations about subsequent health care
utilization, and other unmeasured variables. In fact, families who expect to
make substantial use of medical care will be more likely to refuse to
participate in the high coinsurance plans. It is at least arguable that
these phenomena will result in an overly optimistic estimate of the effect of
cost-sharing on the medical care use.
In both MRFIT and HIS, data have been collected on the characteristics
of those subjects who refused to participate at the various pre-experimental
stages, at least beyond the initial screening. It may thus be possible to
assess some of the determinants of the decision to participate, and to
correct for potential non-participation biases. But the determinants of the
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decision to participate, it must be recognized, are not easily measured. So
long as such intangibles play an important role, potential non-participation
biases cannot be completely excluded. Moreover, replenishment of non-
participants on the basis of observed characteristics, as suggested by
Morris, Newhouse, and Archibald (1980), could be inappropriate.
Subject Attrition Biases
Since MRFIT and HIS are still in progress, little information on
attrition rates has been published. In the Health Insurance Study, the 3-
year cumulative attrition rates for the free plans and non-free plans have
been 4 percent and 8 percent, respectively. In the MRFIT experiment, vital
status has thus far been ascertainable for almost all of the participants.
But the ascertainment of other morbid endpoints, such as non-fatal heart
attacks, has been more difficult. Detection of these morbid events (by
self-report or by evidence on periodic electrocardiograms) required subjects'
returning for repeated checkups and examinations. At the end of the second
year of the study, 6 percent of the Special Intervention group and 7.2
percent of the Usual Care group had missed their annual examinations. These
proportions were 8 and 9 percent, respectively, by the fourth year. Among
the SI participants, 16.3 percent had missed their triannual interim visits
by the fourth year. The extent to which non-reporting subjects experienced a
higher incidence of non-fatal morbid events is unclear.
It must be emphasized that subject attrition does not merely erode the
statistical power of an experiment. Those who drop out may be least
susceptible to the contemplated intervention. Certain imperfect covariates
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of the decision to drop out can be measured. But any attempt to correct for
unmeasured determinants requires a model of the distribution of these
determinants. The interpretation of the experimental effect may then be very
sensitive to unverifiable assumptions about the parametric form of such a
model (Harris, 1981; Hausman and Wise, this volume). In micro-experiments,
the only foolproof remedy for attrition bias is to keep subjects from
dropping out altogether.
Hawthorne Effects and Anticipatory Responses
The subject's knowledge of his treatment assignment raises some serious
problems for the MRFIT experiment. Although the Usual Care subject does not
receive the benefits of group sessions, counseling, behavioral therapy and
dietary instruction, he and his physician are informed of his risk status.
Moreover, subjects in the UC group are asked, as in the SI group, to return
for periodic visits and examinations. Highly motivated subjects who consent
to randomization, but who end up in the UC group, may nevertheless alter
their behavior. At the very least, this phenomenon will reduce the contrast
between UC and SI interventions and diminish the power of the experiment.
Preliminary reports from MRFIT (Sherwin et al., 1979; Kuller et al.,
1980; Schoenberger , 1981) in fact show improvements in risk factor scores for
both SI and UC groups. After four years, SI men exhibited an 11 mm Hg drop
in diastolic blood pressure, a 19 mg/dl drop in serum cholesterol, and a 41
percent smoking cessation rate. UC men showed a 6 mm Hg drop in diastolic
blood pressure, an 11 mg/dl drop in serum cholesterol, and a 23 percent
smoking cessation rate. Among SI men, 56 percent were being treated with
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antihypertensive drugs, compared to 41 percent in the UC group. These
improvements could reflect further regression toward the mean, or trends in
behavior independent of the experiment.^ But the motivating effect of the
experiment itself can hardly be excluded.
MRFIT experimenters recognize that many years may be required before the
observed changes in risk factors are manifested in reduced CHD rates. In
that case, the long-term mortality results will hinge critically on subjects'
behavior after the termination of formal life-style intervention. Perhaps
the UC men, who received dramatic attention only in the pre-experimental
period and who were forced to take responsibility for their behavior from the
start, will display greater long-run improvements. By contrast, if SI
subjects become dependent upon the experiment itself, then discontinuation
of formal intervention could lead to higher relapse rates (Syme, 1978).
The planners of the HIS have made special efforts to detect
instrumentation artifacts and anticipatory responses (Newhouse et al
.
, 1979).
Participants' incentives to file insurance claims might depend on the amount
of reimbursement. Hence, the plan assigment could affect subjects' reporting
of medical care utilization. To avoid this interaction between treatment and
measurement of response, a system of weekly reminders to file claims was
used. But the reminders themselves were also found to affect reporting.
Therefore, a subexperiment involving biweekly probes was instituted. Since
intrusive questionnaires and health reports could also affect subject desires
^Initial cholesterol levels among all MRFIT randomized subjects, as well
as dietary intake of cholesterol, total fat, and saturated fat, were already
considerably below those observed in previous diet-heart studies.
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to seek medical care, the sequence of examinations was similarly varied in a
subexperiment
.
For the prepaid care group, moreover, a set of "controls on
controls" was employed, with no instrumentation at all. To ascertain whether
certain subjects would earmark the incentive payments solely for medical
care, the schedule of incentive payments and bonuses was also varied. In
order to detect possible anticipatory responses to the beginning and
end of the study, the experimenters plan to follow the three-year
intervention group for an additional two years. They also plan to be
watchful of initial declines in price elasticity after the onset of the
experiment, followed by increases in price sensitivity as the end of the
experiment approaches, followed by post-experimental responses to intra-
experimental price changes (Arrow, 1975).
It is difficult at this stage to see how all these instrumentation and
anticipation artifacts can be estimated precisely. The issue here is not so
much the separate, main effect of each form of instrumentation, but its
interaction with treatment effects. There are too many interactions of
instrumentation, treatment, and subject anticipations to test all of them
satisfactorily. It is not completely clear how information on such artifacts
can be easily incorporated into the final results.
Ethical Constraints
In the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial, ethical considerations
dictated that subjects with initial diastolic blood pressures above 114mm Hg
be excluded from the study. Unfortunately, this form of sample truncation
leads to difficulties similar to those encountered at the other end of the
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risk factor scale. Thus, those individuals with previously undetected,
severe hypertension may be derived from a population least motivated to seek
routine care. These persons may have life styles or other unmeasured
characteristics that counteract or reduce any salutory effects of risk factor
reduction.
Even if a high-risk subject is eligible by screening criteria, ethical
considerations dictate that treatment cannot be completely withheld. Hence,
MRFIT does not compare treatment and nontreatment , but intensive intervention
with "Usual Care." The Usual Care is not even average care, since the men
randomized to the UC group have already undergone pre-experimental
"treatment." Moreover, the planners of the experiment felt compelled to tell
UC subjects that they were at high risk, including which risk factors were
implicated (Kuller et al., 1980).
Interpretation of Treatment Effects
The design of MRFIT explicitly recognizes that people do not change
their CHD risk factors one at a time. But its interpretation is still
complicated by concomitant changes in dimensions of behavior other than the
three risk factors. Subjects who are asked to change the saturated fat
content of their diet may also be influenced to increase their physical
activity, which may in turn affect cardiac status. Men involved in a smoking
cessation group may alter their responses to stress, which could in turn
affect cholesterol levels. Among SI subjects, in fact, nonsmokers and men
who had quit smoking had the greatest improvements in serum cholesterol
(Kuller et al., 1980, Table 8). This makes it difficult to assess whether
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the effect of intervention resulted from changes in diet, serum cholesterol
levels or other factors (Syme, 1978). Furthermore, the methods of life-style
intervention may vary considerably across the 22 clinical centers in MRFIT.
Within a specific MRFIT clinic, treatments are further adapted to the
idiosyncracies of the experimental subject. Even if we regard Special
Intervention as a homogeneous entity. Usual Care remains ill-defined. In the
final analysis, if CHD rates improve with intervention in MRFIT, it may be
difficult to know exactly what was responsible.
To be sure, one might attempt to elucidate the details of the
experimental effect by specifying a response model. Thus, the Health
Insurance Study was designed to estimate contrasts between the effects of
different plans (e.g., the 95 percent coinsurance group versus the free care
group, or the prepaid care group versus the remaining fee-for-service
groups). But as early HIS data came in, the experimenters found the
distribution of health care expenditures to be highly asymmetric, with a
discrete atom at zero expenditures and a fat right-hand tail (Manning,
Morris, Newhouse et al
.
, 1981; Manning, Newhouse, and Ware, 1981). To
perform statistical tests of treatment effects, they therefore proposed a
multiple stage response model, involving the decision to seek care and
expenditures conditional upon that decision. In addition to expenditures,
health status was considered an important outcome measure. But health status
could be both a determinant and a consequence of medical care utilization
(Brook et al., 1979; Ware et al
.
, 1979). These considerations led the
experimenters to some interesting, but even more complicated structural
models of the experimental response. No doubt with further structural
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specifications, price elasticities and the parameters of response to
deductibles and exclusions might also be estimated. I do not wish to
denigrate these sophisticated efforts. But it should be pointed out that the
conclusions derived from detailed response surface models may be very
sensitive to the structural specification assumed by the analyst. As
discussed in several other papers in this volume, such models are far removed
from the classical ideal of the one-way analysis of variance.
Relevance of the Results to Policy Options
Even if MRFIT clearly demonstrates a reduction in CHD risk, its Special
Intervention does not necessarily correspond to a viable policy option. For
one thing, widespread intervention at the individual level is expensive.
Although employment-based health and fitness programs have become more
prevalent, they may be quite different from the specialized research
environments of the MRFIT clinical centers. Moreover, changes in life style
are likely to involve social learning, the diffusion of information, the
changing of norms, and other phenomena that render individuals' responses
interdependent. It is not clear that MRFIT captures these phenomena
(Farquhar, 1978; Kasl, 1978; Syme, 1978). Finally, such micro-experiments
reveal little about the effects of mobilizing voluntary health agencies,
public restrictions on smoking, or the use of the mass media. Thus, MRFIT
may reveal that CHD rates can be reversed. It may also offer some
confirmation of the causal effects of risk factors. But it will offer much
less information on the magnitudes of treatment effects in the general
population. We could still be far from an operational public policy for
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preventing coronary heart disease.
The Health Insurance Study was designed primarily to be a demand
experiment. Except for comparative analysis of responses at sites with
different supply conditions, no attempt was made to assess the supply
response to an insurance-induced increase in demand. Nor were the market
equilibrium effects of changes in coverage at issue. Yet the supply response
to changes in insurance coverage is a critical factor in the recent rapid
rise of health care expenditures in this country (Feldstein, 1977; Harris,
1979, 1980; Newhouse, 1978), Even after the HIS results are complete,
policy-makers contemplating changes in insurance coverage will still be
uncertain about the effects of reimbursement on hospital behavior, the
consequences of insurance subsidy for technological change, or the effect of
extensive insurance on competitive market discipline.
The HIS, to be sure, focuses to a great extent on ambulatory care
demand. If the supply of ambulatory care were relatively elastic, and if the
supply response of the ambulatory care sector were independent of the
remainder of the health care sector, then the results of the experiment may
offer a more complete picture of the ambulatory care market response. Even
so, the behavior of the elderly population, who consume a substantial and
growing fraction of health care costs, is not assessed in HIS. The decision
to exclude the Medicare-eligible population from HIS was based on practical
concerns about pre-experimental and experimental logistics. And a case can
be made that an experiment on elderly responses to insurance ought to be
designed very differently. But if young and old demand from the same
suppliers, then changes in the coverage of the under-65 population could
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affect the price and access to care of the elderly. What is more, the
redistributive effects of changes in insurance may be quite different in the
market than within the confines of the micro-experiment. At the very least,
the proper application of the Health Insurance Study results to policy
decisions necessitates the use of other non-experimental data.
3. POSSIBLE MACRO-EXPERIMENTAL REMEDIES
I now set forth the background of an illustrative macro-experiment.
The Stanford Heart Disease Prevention Program (SHDPP)
From 1972 to 1975, the Stanford Heart Disease Prevention Program
(Farquhar, 1978; Farquhar et al., 1977; Meyer, Nash, McAlister et al., 1980;
Stern et al., 1976) conducted a field experiment in three California
communities, each with a population of approximately 15,000. The objective
was to develop methods for modifying CHD risk that would be generally
applicable to other community settings. Previous research had suggested that
mass media campaigns directed at large populations could effectively transmit
information, alter some attitudes, and produce small shifts in behavior, such
as influencing consumer product choice. But the effect of the media on more
complex behavior was poorly characterized.
The planners of SHDPP therefore attempted a factorial experiment, in
which the combined effect of mass media and individualized intervention was
assessed. From pre-experimental surveys in all three towns, they drew a
subsample of men and women, aged 35 to 59, at high risk for CHD on the basis
of cigarette smoking, blood pressure, and cholesterol level. In two towns
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(Watsonville and Gilroy), an extensive media campaign was conducted. In
Watsonville only, two-thirds of the high-risk subjects were randomly assigned
to individualized intervention, while the remaining third served as the
media-only control. In the third town (Tracy), no intervention was
performed. Most of the reported results of this experiment have been derived
from annual follow-up surveys of the sampled high-risk individuals in the
three towns.
Since the trial was to be coordinated from a single research center,
intervention was restricted only to three towns. Although the assignment to
individualized intervention in Watsonville was performed randomly, the
allocation of media-based treatments was non-random. Although the three
towns were geographically isolated, the overlapping television signals of
Watsonville and Tracy dictated that these two towns be assigned to media
intervention.
Longitudinal versus Cross-Sectional Sampling
The planners of the SHDPP experiment, as I see it, made a serious but
avoidable error of instrumentation: they relied upon longitudinal
observations from a cohort of pre-experimentally screened, high-risk
subjects. To be sure, changes in CHD mortality statistics in each community
over four years might have been too small to distinguish a treatment effect.
A longitudinal sample may have appeared most appropriate to ascertain non-
fatal coronary events, as well as changes over time in behavior and knowledge
of risk factors. Because media intervention was not randomly assigned, it
may have seemed logical to use serial observations on many variables to
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bolster the claim that an observed effect was causal. But reliance on a
cohort of pre-experimentally screened subjects leaves the experimental
results wide open to many of the criticisms of micro-experimentation,
including selection artifacts, attrition biases, and Hawthorne effects.
Of the entire pre-experimental sample of 2151 subjects in the three
towns, only 1204 actually completed all three follow-up surveys. The great
fraction of those who failed to complete the study actively refused to
participate or later dropped out (Stern et al
.
, 1976, Table 1; Maccoby et
al
.
, 1977, Table 1). Among the 381 high-risk subjects who completed the
baseline survey and who had not moved or died, 75 had dropped out after two
years (Maccoby et al
.
, 1977, Table 2). By three years, the attrition rates
among eligible high-risk subjects varied from 22 to 33 percent of eligible
subjects across towns (Meyer, Nash, McAlister et al., 1980, Table 2). The
average dietary cholesterol and saturated fat intake, smoking prevalence and
intensity, and systolic and diastolic blood pressures generally showed
improvements over time in both experimental and control groups (Meyer et al.,
1980, Table 4). After three years, the only striking finding was that the
subjects given both media exposure and individualized instruction had quit
smoking at a higher rate than the other groups. Relative weight and blood
pressure showed no difference, while the differential changes in cholesterol
were only suggestive. In view of these results, it is not unreasonable to
suspect that the ultimate participants in SHDPP were highly motivated, that
pre-experimental screening for high risks yielded an unrepresentative
population, that subject attrition was biased, favoring a positive treatment
effect, and that many subjects were aware of the presence of an experiment.
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These difficulties, I maintain, should not be inherent to macro-
experiments. Since the treatments are applied at the market or community
level, there is no compelling reason why the responses in each unit should be
obtained from a cohort. Sufficiently large, independent cross-section
samples could be used to assess endpoints within each macro-unit. Since all
of the residents in a community are subject to the same treatment, it matters
little if different residents are sampled pre- and post-experimentally. Even
in the case of certain morbid events of CHD, repeated cross-section samples
of health care providers could serve as a reasonable substitute for
longitudinal samples. To be sure, these procedures sacrifice precision. But
they avoid the biases engendered by subjects' decisions to participate and
remain in a cohort, as well as their awareness of participation in an
experiment .^
It is arguable that this tradeoff between bias and precision does not
differ from that encountered in micro-experimentation. Thus, the
experimenter who does not screen on risk factors or other dependent variables
sacrifices statistical power. Overcoming this loss of precision requires
more subjects, which in turn increases the cost of the experiment. However,
the cost of increasing the size of repeated cross-sectional surveys within
communities may be far less than the cost of including additional subjects in
a longitudinal micro-experiment, with all its follow-up interviews, diaries
and logs.
"^In the Stanford Five-City Project, the Pawtucket Heart Health Program,
and the Minnesota Community Prevention Program, a mixture of cohort and
cross-section sampling has apparently been used.
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The advantage of repeated cross-section samples in macro-experiments is
that individual subjects are less likely to be aware of the experiment. In
fact it may be possible to perform blinded experiments, or at least blinded
controls.^ Even if some subjects became aware of experimentation, their
incentives to avoid or anticipate the treatment may be weaker than in a
micro-experiment, where subjects can make decisions to participate separately
from other economic choices. Thus, in a macro-experiment, an individual will
have less incentive to leave a community merely to avoid certain media
messages. So long as a different cross-section is sampled on each round,
refusals to respond are much less severe a problem. Of course, it is
possible for an entire community to be aware of the presence of the
experiment. But it is hardly clear that this is so undesirable. If the
institution of an experimental policy causes anticipatory emigration, or
compensatory changes in local laws, or mass protests, that would appear to be
a result worth knowing.
Repeated cross-section sampling in macro-experiments may further avoid
ethical problems inherent in individual randomization. This is because the
controls in a macro-experiment are "faceless," and the lives at stake are not
specifically identified. To be sure, any subject found during sampling to be
at high risk must still be informed of his condition and referred
appropriately. However, so long as the experimenter samples from independent
cross-sections, and so long as the samples are not large in comparison to the
^A blind control community is planned for the Pawtucket Heart Health
Program.
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population of the community, these ethical obligations should not materially
affect the results. It is arguable that imposing involuntary participation
on the citizens of a community is itself unethical (Hulley and Fortmann,
1980). But I do not see this objection as insurmountable.
Costs of Macro-Experimentation
Macro-experiments may incur lower costs of instrumentation. But the
more difficult question is the costs of treatment. In a micro-experiment,
only those individuals who are recruited and sampled undergo treatment. In a
macro-experiment, everyone in a community receives the treatment, even if his
experimental response is not measured.
Certain types of macro-experiments, such as those involving price
subsidies in large communities, are undoubtedly very expensive. But in many
instances macro-experimental intervention may exhibit significant economies
of scale. This applies especially to the use of mass media in SHDPP and
related experiments, where the marginal cost of exposing an additional person
to a health message is near zero.
Relevance of Macro-Experimentation
Despite its flaws of instrumentation, the SHDPP media experiment had one
salient advantage over clinical trials such as MRFIT. The experimental
treatment—that is, the use of mass media to transmit health information, to
alter preferences, and possibly to change behavior—corresponded to a genuine
policy option. The micro-experiment may have revealed little about the
social and behavioral mechanisms underlying the response to media
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intervention (Leventhal et al
.
, 1980). But the elucidation of mechanisms, I
contend, should not be the objective of macro-experimentation. The main idea
is to observe the effect of a contemplated policy in an experimental setting
that closely approximates the environment in which the policy is to be
applied.
The logical response, of course, is to ask whether the "black box"
results of a macro-experiment are really relevant to the policy under
consideration. Even if SHDPP and its progeny experiments should demonstrate
an effect of media intervention on coronary risk factors and rates, how do we
know that media intervention will succeed in other communities? To this and
related questions I now turn.
4. MORE PROBLEMS WITH MACRO-EXPERIMENTS
The Confounding of Treatment Effects and Site Effects
The most serious difficulty with the Stanford three-city trial is the
experimenters' misconception about the number of independent observations in
their sample. In virtually every scientific report on this study, the
authors assumed that the number of independent observations equalled the
total number of sampled subjects in the three communities. This assumption
would be valid if applied only to the Watsonville micro-experiment in which
subjects were individually randomized. But for the mass media macro-
experiments, there were really only three independent observations.
Confusion over the number of degrees of freedom in macro-experiments has
been widespread. In fact, the issue appears to have been resolved, broached
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all over, and then settled several times in the literature. Yet
biostatisticians continue to propose formulas for appropriate sample size in
community trials as if the individual were the unit of randomization (Gillum
et al., 1980).
The confusion derives in part from the view that outcome measurement in
community prevention trials is merely a form of cluster sampling (Cornfield,
1978; Gillum et al
.
, 1980), If the experimenter wishes to estimate, say,
CHD death rates, then sampling by community, rather than by individuals, will
increase the variance of estimated population rates. The increase in
variance would be inversely related to the degree of homogeneity of death
rates within communities and directly related to the extent of heterogeneity
between communities. Hence, if the experimenter could select relatively
homogeneous intervention sites, the loss of efficiency would appear to be
minimal. But this view ignores the fact that an experiment has been
conducted and must be interpreted. The real issue is that in the
interpretation of the results, the "site effects" are confounded with the
"treatment effects."
Consider the following example. Suppose that community A is chosen for
a media campaign and community B is selected as control. Suppose further
that we could randomly allocate N subjects each to live in these two towns.
Each subject, it is assumed, belongs to a homogeneous population with respect
to pre-experimental risk of CHD. How should we interpret the results of the
media campaign? If we believed that the two communities were merely
artificial vessels for separating experimental from control groups, and that
within each community there was no intercorrelation of subject responses.
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then we have 2N observations on the two treatments. But if the billboard
density in a conmunity affects the frequency of messages, or the ideology of
the local television station owner affects the prominence of health-related
commercials, or if the configuration of voluntary agencies affects opinion
leadership, or if social networks permit greater diffusion of information, or
if subjects' responses depend on their conformity with others, or if
subjects' changes in dietary habits depend on food prices in a community,
then we no longer have 2N independent observations. Even if we could
randomly assign subjects to communities A and B, the results could be quite
different if town B were instead chosen for intervention and town A were
instead chosen for the control. Moreover, it would not help to assess the
pre-experimental variance of death rates between and within communities. By
construction, these variances would all be zero. The issue is not pre-
experimental death rates, but the responses of death rates to the
intervention.
To be sure, site effects are common in micro-experiments, such as MRFIT,
where the size of the experiment dictates the deployment of multiple clinical
centers. But the situation in micro-experiments is considerably different
because randomization of subjects takes place within each site. Hence, site
effects can be distinguished from treatment effects and site-treatment
interactions can be tested.
The literature on clinical trials is replete with tests of site effects
and site-treatment interactions (e.g., hospital effects in the National
Halothane Study, clinical center effects in the University Group Diabetes
trial of insulin versus oral hypoglycemic agents). Hopefully, in the
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analysis of the final results of MRFIT, treatment successes at particular
clinical centers will receive scrutiny. But in pure macro-experiments, there
is no cross-over of treatments within a community. The site effects are
fully nested within the treatments. Sampling more subjects at each site will
diminish the variance of the estimated death rate within each site. But it
will not affect the precision of these site-treatment interactions. In fact,
if we have only two treatments and two sites, there are no degrees of freedom
to disentangle these treatment-site interactions. Only more sites will solve
this difficulty.
External Validity
When the experimenter tests for site-treatment interactions, he is
asking whether any specific characteristic of a market or community could be
uniquely responsible for, say, an observed effect of media campaigns. If he
samples enough communities, he can distinguish between a general media
effect, applicable to all sites, and media effects that are merely
idiosyncratic for certain communities. But then how does the experimenter
know that the selected sites constitute a representative sample of these
idiosyncracies? What would be the effect of media intervention in
communities where a single, large employer also started his own employee
health program, or where a national manufacturer test-marketed a new, low-
cholesterol product? If relatively small towns were selected, as in SHDPP,
what would the results tell us about the effects of intervention in large
cities? Would they be relevant to macro-experiments on work groups or
domiciliary institutions (Rose et al
.
, 1980; Sherwin, 1978; WHO European
Collaborative Group, 1974)?
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So long as the site-treatment interactions are regarded as random
effects, the experimenter is obligated to choose judiciously experimental
sites that are representative of the environment in which the policy is to be
instituted. I recognize that even in macro-experiments, one ought to select
sites that are not wholly unrepresentative. It is thus worth inquiring
whether the communities selected for HIS possess doctors, hospitals, medical
standards and institutions that are typical of the United States. And I have
already inquired whether the clinical centers in MRFIT are representative of
programs of individualized intervention throughout the country. But it seems
to me that the burden on macro-experiments is much greater.
Randomization of Macro-Units
Many of the proponents of community-based intervention trials regard
randomization as an impractical ideal. There are just too many
administrative and political obstacles. Unfortunately, I see virtually no
way out of the requirement that experimental sites, once selected, must be
allocated randomly to treatments. I acknowledge numerous instances where
evidence from nonrandomized studies has proved convincing. But in those
cases, the analysis has hinged on a paucity of plausible rival explanations
for the observed difference between treatment and control groups (Campbell
and Stanley, 1966). But in macro-experimentation, there are likely to be an
abundance of rival explanations. It is not hard to imagine that a town with
its own television station or health-conscious opinion leaders will be more
willing to undergo a media campaign. Such a community may be more
susceptible to the effects of such an intervention.
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5. TOWARD A SCIENCE OF MACRO-EXPERIMENTATION
Despite substantial advances in design, execution and interpretation,
micro-experiments still have serious and possibly inherent difficulties.
Individuals make non-random decisions to participate or drop out of the
experiment. They may be influenced by the instrumentation process. Even in
the absence of these difficulties, micro-experiments do not necessarily test
real policy options. Macro-experimentation, on the other hand, may avoid
some of these problems. But convincing macro-experiments require many
observations at the community or market level. Moreover, political and
administrative factors may dictate non-random selection of communities, with
its attendant difficulties. And there is always uncertainty whether the
observed effect of treatment in a sample of communities was not due to
idiosyncratic, unrepresentative characteristics of the experimental sites.
We are thus faced with a serious dilemma. Should we perform a micro-
experiment, optimistic that instrumentation artifacts will not arise, and
thankful to learn something about one aspect of a complicated policy problem?
Or should we plunge ahead with a "sloppy" macro-experiment, with all of its
difficulties of interpretation and generalization?
Decentralized Macro-Experiments
Because SHDPP was to be coordinated by a single research center, the
experiment was restricted to only three towns. Once these three were
selected, random assignment to media exposure was made impossible by
overlapping television signals. But it is worth speculating what
experimental design might have arisen from a multi-center trial. If the
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Stanford group had been one of many research centers, couldn't they have
selected a pair of towns, both of which had non-overlapping television
signals? Why couldn't treatment be randomly assigned between the two towns?
Why couldn't the Stanford city-pair be one block in a larger matched pair
experiment?
My point here is that many of the most serious difficulties of macro-
experiments may result from over-centralization. So long as we could
allocate pairs of comparable sites (or perhaps larger subsets) to individual
experimental blocks, the execution of each block could be the responsibility
of a separate research center. Within each block, randomization may be more
feasible. Increasing the statistical power of the experiment, and perhaps
its external validity, means increasing the number of blocks.
Such a design is not entirely speculative. In fact, the WHO European
Collaborative Group (1974; Rose et al., 1980) has been conducting a macro-
experiment in CHD prevention in 12 pairs of factories in various cities.
These factories (or in some cases occupational units within factories) were
recruited into the trial before random assignment to treatment or control.
The factory pairs were matched as far as possible by age, geographical area
and the nature of the industry. The subjects include all male employees aged
40 to 59 years, and not merely those at high risk. This design unfortunately
involves longitudinal follow-up of cohorts. Hence, it may be susceptible to
participation biases, selective employee turnover, and Hawthorne effects.
But it illustrates the possibility of randomization within blocked pairs of
macro-units
.
One might object that only small units, such as factories and
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domiciliary institutions, are susceptible to randomization (Sherwin, 1978).
Larger political entities will merely balk at the uncertain prospect of
receiving the less desirable assignment. But it is hardly clear to me that
this state of affairs is inevitable. For one thing, the possibility of
randomization among matched pairs may be more palatable politically than
random drawings from a larger population of sites. In some cases where the
eligible sites are political subdivisions under the governance of a higher
authority, the possibility of site self-selection may not be so serious. In
fact, several macro-experiments in cancer screening, in which census tracts,
townships, or counties are the relevant sites, have already been proposed
(Apostolides and Henderson, 1977). Moreover, in cases where communities or
organizations have already received some type of government grant or benefit,
the continued receipt of that benefit could be made the incentive for
participation in the experiment. In cases where various communities apply
for grants to become demonstration sites for a particular innovation, the
awards process could be broken down into two stages. A subset of deserving,
eligible sites would first be chosen. Among eligible sites, treatment and
control assignments could then be made. It is remarkable to me how often
government agencies and other grantors first make the awards to the most
deserving sites and then ponder how a comparable set of control sites is to
be chosen from the losers for the purpose of project evaluation.
When intervention at a large number of sites is managed by one research
or administrative group, the inevitable consequence is a rationing of limited
intervention effort to a few sites. In extreme cases, many of the so-called
intervention sites do not receive any intervention because the research team
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has merely lost control of the project. Administrative decentralization of
macro-experiments could allay some of these problems. Moreover, some degree
of blinding may be possible. At the least, a research team responsible for
intervention in one block of sites need not know the progress of the
experiment in other blocks.
Time-Series Experiments and Cross-Over Designs
The possibility that communities or other macro-units could serve as
their own controls has not been adequately explored. Admittedly, any
comparison over time is susceptible to confounding interpretations.
Experimental responses take some time to be completed. What appears to be
the effect of a cross-over may actually be a transient from earlier
intervention (Morris, Newhouse, and Archibald, 1980). If the macro-
experiment is not blinded, then the effects of cross-over could be confused
with anticipatory responses or other Hawthorne effects. Nevertheless, there
is a variety of familiar devices for detecting time-varying responses.
Although these devices have been derived from micro-experiments, they could
at least be tried in the macro-setting.
For example, in the case of a matched pair design, the treatment and
control communities could reverse their assignments later in the experiment.
The timing of this reversal need not be scheduled in advance, or at least
known to the experimental units. Stopping short of complete cross-over, I
could also envisage folding back designs. We could begin by a series of
observations on communities in which no intervention is instituted.
Thereafter, one or more of the communities becomes a treatment site. In
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sequence, the remaining communities receive the intervention. Again, the
sequence and schedule of assignment could be random and unknown to the
experimental units. If all of the units are destined ultimately to receive
the intervention, randomization with respect to the sequence and timing of
the intervention may not present so many political or administrative
obstacles.
Mixed Macro and Micro Designs
In some cases, a mixture of micro and macro designs might enhance the
power of the experiment. Such cases arise when the interventions at the
individual and site levels are qualitatively similar.
In the SHDPP trial, a subexperiment of individual intervention was
performed within Watsonville, a town receiving media intervention. This
subexperiment was designed to test the interaction between the two types of
experimental treatments. Unfortunately, the investigators failed to conduct
an identical subexperiment in Tracy, the town receiving no media
intervention. But even if a full factorial design had been undertaken, the
two types of treatment were so qualitatively different that only their crude
interaction could be profitably investigated.
But in other cases, both interventions could be close enough to conform
to a simple response model. Suppose, for example, that the experimenter
wishes to investigate the effects of varying employer contributions to
employee health insurance premiums. Since changes in employee benefits are
typically performed at the level of the firm, a macro-experiment would be
appropriate, with various firms corresponding to different macro sites. But
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within each firm, employer contributions could be further varied among
employees. Such an experiment could offer considerable insight into firm-
specific and employee-specific responses to changes in employee premium
subsidies
.
Combining Macro-Experiments
A potential significant advantage of macro-experimental blocking is its
ability to enhance the external validity of the experiment. Within each
block, experimental sites might possess similar characteristics. But between
blocks the site characteristics could vary considerably. In community-based
life-style intervention, it would be especially informative for blocks to
vary with respect to the size, climate, age structure, sex, racial and ethnic
composition of their member communities.
A number of independent community-based life-style intervention trials
are already in progress in this country. Taken together, these trials might
be considered a single macro-experiment with multiple blocks. The difficulty
with this interpretation, however, is that the method of intervention may
vary considerably from one block to the next. We thus cannot easily
distinguish between a block effect and a block-treatment interaction. If
some community trials show significant effects of life-style intervention and
others do not, it will be unclear whether the discrepancies resulted from
differences in the type of media intervention across trials, or differences
in the susceptibility of communities to media messages. The results of
different trials could be combined only if we had some prior information on
the relationship between types of media intervention employed.
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Some recent theoretical work on combining diverse experiments might be
usefully applied to this problem (DuMouchel and Harris, 1981). A complete
exposition is necessarily beyond the scope of the present paper. But the
main idea is to specify formally a structural relationship between the
treatment effects in each community trial. For example, the magnitude of the
effect on CHD rates might depend on the extent of electronic media
intervention, the duration of intervention, or the recruitment of voluntary
agencies. A model of the treatment effect that relates these characteristics
is then superimposed upon the results of each trial. The main issue in the
application of such a technique is the degree to which life-style
intervention in each trial was independent of the characteristics of the
communities under observation. For example, if the experimenters in a
particular trial resorted to scientifically-oriented media messages because
the target communities were highly educated, it may be impossible to
distinguish between the treatment effect of media content and the role of
educational background in a community's response.
Competition Experiments, Regulation Experiments and Deregulation Experiments
Reduction of the tax subsidy on health insurance coverage, elimination
of barriers to entry for prepaid health care providers, and enhancement of
consumer choice of health insurance plans have been proposed to control
rising health care expenditures. Virtually all of the evidence supporting
the efficacy of these interventions in non-experimental. Our policy-makers
could, of course, take the available data as sufficient cause to plunge ahead
with a full-scale policy. But the correct course, it seems to me, is to
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assess some of these innovations experimentally before taking such drastic
action. I have already hinted how several large employers in a number of
different cities might serve as sites for experimental changes in employee
health insurance benefits. Perhaps several distinct divisions of the same
large corporation could form an experimental block. Community-based
experiments, in which the effects on market competition are observed, are
also conceivable.
Regulatory controls on health care expenditures have also been
suggested. Although various innovative forms of hospital reimbursement have
been tried, most of the so-called reimbursement experiments have really been
uncontrolled demonstration projects. In view of the substantial likelihood
that hospitals subject to those novel controls have been selected in a biased
manner, it is hard to know exactly what significance these projects should
have for future policy decisions. It is difficult for me to see why the
experimenters have not blocked participating hospitals according to, say,
size, teaching status, or range of facilities, and then randomly assigned the
novel form of reimbursement within each blocck.
One variant of the fold-back design discussed above is the deregulation
experiment. In this case, the experimental treatment is the removal of an
intervention already in place. The sequence and timing of deregulation at
various sites is the critical control variable. This type of design may be
particularly useful when the value of a regulatory program is in question.
Even if our policy-makers deem that physician peer review schemes or health
planning agencies are to be discontinued, it would be valuable to learn
something about the effects of these policies during their demise.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper can be easily criticized for its lack of balance. I have
sought out the most subtle crack in micro-experiments. Yet I am willing to
cover large faults in macro-experiments with hopeful speculation.
The plain truth is that macro-experiments in public policy—or at least
corrupted versions of macro-experiments—are far more prevalent than the
micro-experiments to which social scientists have devoted so much attention.
It is not too soon to develop some meaningful strategies for effective macro-
experimentation.
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